Part of the story of Egypt in 3years – By Hossam Badrawi 

 Part of the story of Egypt in 3years 

 By Hossam Badrawi 

 February 2014 

When i received an invitation from 3 different anchors of popular talk shows in the last 2 weeks to  share my views about what is currently happening in Egypt and the prospects of the future, i found  myself spontaneously hesitating to accept invitation. I requested to postpone interviews for 2 rea sons, the first was to avoid talking about the past , particularly in February of the year , as every  one wanted me ,again , to reveal secrets of the time i spent in the core of actions, after being  called for by ex president Mubarak to lead the ruling party at the time. As i resigned one week later,  due to political differences in how to interact with demonstrators, it became the interest of media to  know what exactly happened and how?. After 3 years, i did not want to be trapped in this era , or  displaced from sharing my views for the future of the country, which is more important and less  talked about. 

The second reason was rather hidden in my subconscious. I re- analyzed my TV interviews in June  2013, in which i criticized the MBs loudly, with logistics. I found that i was freely announcing my  political position, and attacking the incompetence of ex president Morsi and his repeated stupid  speeches , and actions. The question raised , when asked to be interviewed today , is ” do i have  the same freedom today or not ?. 

It seemed to me that my subconscious was under the impression that i have less freedom now  than before!!. I was really upset to realize that the zone of freedom is narrower. Part of that is relat ed to the MBs terrorist attacks to the public that positioned opinionated people into either with or  against the government which myopically reduced the zone of tolerance and freedom of speech.  However , another reality is that their is now a wave of intolerance to opposition point of view in  the government.  

There is no getting around it. i politically realize the MBs rule is a fascistic alternative however i  have fears and reservations about how things are moving forwards today.  

How did that happen? . Why are we in this situation today?  

The Story of Egypt 

The 2011 uprising left the security apparatus in Egypt only partially intact. We dis covered later on, that one of the most important objectives of those running the show  behind the revolution namely the MBs, was to ruin the brain of the security institu tion within the ministry of interior and creat sever tension between any security uni form and the people. However, the military retained their autonomy and appeared  intact with confidence yet leaning to support any civil structure but the NDP , which  was governing the politics and elections but not really ruling the country .  

Unfortunately , the moslem brotherhood and salafies were the only replacement of  the NDP. They had the organization and the funding. People in tahrir were not revolt ing to give the political isslam the power , but in my opinion , the armed forces were  after removing the NDP structure from the power game as fast as they can . Mind you  , the constitution at that time ,was clear that the next president of Egypt was going to  be a civilian from the existing political parties. 

 The question of who would hold political office was open to narrow negotiation.   It seems to me that the generals didn’t mind trying out the power-hungry Ikhwan.  They were more organized than the activists who sparked the revolt, and the only al ternative to the potentially organized remnants of the NDP which was the objective of  organized political attacks and character assassination by the revolutionists, Al Ek wan ( MBs) and actually clearly not welcomed by the generals SCAF.  

Creating a political vacuum was the trap Egypt went through blinded by the massive  propaganda created to exclude organized political powers but the MBs 

MBs didn’t pose, at the time, any threat to military privileges. Actually I believe they  had no intention of dismantling the infrastructure of dictatorship and submitting  themselves to the volatile moods of a democratic process; they just wanted to take  Mubarak’s place at the top. Their first enemy was Egypt’s intelligence apparatus  which know every thing about them , sources of wealth and connection to in 

ternational intelligences in the world, and some leaders ( whom they could not in criminate) which posed a still , possible political opponents, and they (MBs) suc ceeded in getting rid of both using all kinds of attacks and later on by putting an ar ticle if the Islamic constitution to prevent any of those leaders to run for office for 10  

years. 

On February 2011, while the protesters were still entrenched in Tahrir Square, Morsi  and the future head of the Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party, Saad al-Katatni, en tered into secret negotiations with the intelligence chief, Omar Soliman for a larger  share of power in return for stopping the revolt. I personally attended one of those  meetings on February 5th, in which Morsi represented MBs, few days after escaping  from his prison with the help of militant attacks, suspected at the time, proved later  on ,to be Hamas militants who crossed borders in Gaza for that reason.. I in my polit ical capacity at the time, put the inquiry to VP Soliman, and he urged me to trust him  and not to create more turbulence in negotiations as so much is going on beyond  what appears on the surface. I was then excluded from any future negotiation and to tally put in the dark for fear of not being a team player, as posed by some of the pres ident aids who considered my presence as a threat to the regime and did not approve  my appointment to lead the ruling party in the first place. 

Once Mubarak was ousted, the MBs pushed for ,and adopted the military-security  program: elections first, constitution and reform later. Those few who argued, includ ing myself, that new democracies need to establish some basic guidelines before  rushing to the ballot box were dismissed , attacked, and marginalized . 

Throughout the transitional period, after wining a little above 40% of parliament  seats, 2012, as expected , against non organized politically divided block ,the MBs  flipped the coin and blamed the protesters for the violence directed at them by the 

state–they were staging illegal protests, after all – and repeatedly alleged that the ac tivists were pawns of foreign intelligence services. In parliament, they took every op portunity to praise Egypt’s law enforcers and blocked every attempt to hold them ac countable after they took control of them.  

As soon as Morsi was sworn in, he congratulated the police for reforming them selves, audaciously referring to them as esteemed partners in the 2011 uprising.  Needless to say, security abuses surged during Morsi’s short tenure, and official coer cion was reinforced by the Brothers’ own militias. They aimed to tune all forces to  the benefit of maintaining their grasp on power. 

The Brothers believed that sacrificing revolutionaries was morally and practically  justified. They felt entitled to exclusive rule after decades of toil. They had spent their  best years behind bars: why should they now share power with a bunch of political  adolescents? And how could the guardians of Islam ally themselves with irreverent  secularists? As for the security apparatus, even if it could be dismantled, why would  they want that when it was such an asset to them being in control. It isn’t hard to un 

derstand the cynicism that greeted the Brothers last June when they accused the pro testers of selling out the revolution and allowing the police state to ‘return’. 

 The “democratically elected” MBs president Morsi and his regime broke all the rules  and covenants of legitimacy. In November 2012, the Supreme Court was besieged by  the president’s followers for more than 30 days to obstruct justice and delay the sen tencing in two crucial cases related to the constitutionality of both the Constituent  Assembly and the Upper House (the Shoura Council). 

During these days the president bestowed on himself the right to legislate and immu nized all his decrees from legal pursuit. He removed the Prosecutor General, breaking  his constitutional oath and appointed the man of his choice, breaking yet again his  constitutional limits. He thus became the Superman ruler of Egypt: the CEO, the leg islator and the magistrate. 

The MBs, with their president, who only spoke to them, has created institutional en emies everywhere all the time. Media, Judges, intellectuals, tourism sector, police of ficers, professionals, academia and workers has all been alienated one way or anoth er either by violent actions, or by appointment of incompetent MBs in leading posi tions, or proposed laws of exclusion together with threats to all privet TV stations,  

reporters and private sector big companies. 

The Morsi government has succeeded to generate this ill-advised militancy single  handed in only few months. He broke promises to seek consensus with secular and  opposition forces. After forcing through the constitution which divided the country,  he tried nonstop to impose his control over the judiciary, media and civil society  groups. MBs also have devised laws that would tilt future elections in its favor.

Perhaps more significantly, MBs government has infuriated average Egyptians with  its poor management. Cities were plagued with power outages and fuel shortages, in flation and unemployment were growing and investment was dormant. It was the  Brothers’ complacency, that alienated their revolutionary allies and, more important,  the majority of Egyptian people.  

I think Egyptian military had hoped to relieve itself of the burden of everyday gover nance in order to focus on more pressing concerns: rebuilding its capacity as a com bat force; diversifying its sources of hardware beyond the US; demilitarizing Sinai;  and finding ways to project its power in the region. They expected the MBs to pacify  the street. But the Brothers proved to be the worst sort of negotiator: unprincipled and  incompetent. None of the three contenders in Egypt’s post-revolt political sphere was  strong enough to rule alone: the old regime was resented; the Islamists were inexperi enced; and the activists were clueless.  

Alliances were needed to break the deadlock. Because the Brothers controlled the ex ecutive and the legislature, the ball was in their court. For months, people put their  lives on hold, wondering when and how the stalemate would come to an end. But the  Brothers were unwilling to compromise. Their plan was to win over the agents of co ercion, but they failed to see that their unwillingness to change would drive their po litical opponents into a tactical alliance against them, and that such an alliance would  force the military to revise its stance. 

 Position of the MBs readiness to give up North of Sini, south of Egypt at Hallaieb, to  secure themselves were two examples of what armed forces would not tolerate. That  was parallel to changing , and expelling Moshir Tantawy and his second man without  consultation with military council. 

General Commander Sisi after holding office ( in my opinion as transient commander  before MBs taking their next action by appointing in this position one of them) of fered to broker an agreement,between Morsi and the people, but the Brothers flexed  their muscles, deploying armed supporters to clear the anti-Islamist sit-in around the  presidential palace in December 2012, killing and torturing dozens in the process (of  all the court cases faced by Morsi and his aides, this is the one I believe that poses  the biggest danger to them). As tensions in the country grew, a body of Rebellions  (tamarod) called on the people to take to the streets on 30th, June 2013 to force early  elections or referendum about MBs president to complete his presidency or not.  

The campaign won the support of every one ,all non-MBs powers, and revolutionary  alike. There was an attempt to exclude groups previously considered part of the old 

regime from the movement, but the revolutionaries couldn’t build a solid enough  front on their own, and finally decided that their best option was to side with every  one, including what is considered old regime . Trading their revolutionary aspirations  for a modest reform agenda seemed better than allowing an Islamist regime to remain  in charge. 

Yet the Brothers’ adversaries would not have been able to field enough foot soldiers  to ensure the army’s co-operation had the masses abstained. 2013 summer’s popular  outburst was historically unprecedented. Millions took to the streets, not once, but  three times in the space of a month: to rebel against MBs on 30 June, to celebrate his  overthrow on 3 July, and to express their defiance of MBs violence on 26 July.  

Even if anyone agree with the MBs allegations that some of the protesters were paid  by the old regime, and that others were persuaded to get involved by the anti-Islamist  media yet they cannot deny that six decades of political bribes and state propaganda  never brought out a fraction of that number: Mubarak couldn’t get more than a hun 

dred thousand supporters onto the streets either at the height of his power or in the  moment of his final desperation; and demonstrations on behalf of the old regime dur ing the 18 months between Mubarak’s downfall and Morsi’s election barely mustered  a few thousand. The reality is that the Islamists alone provoked this unsurpassed pop ular eruption: the Brothers’ dismal performance in government is what ultimately  convinced even the most passive of citizens – the so-called ‘sofa party’ – to leave the  comfort of their homes. 

Perhaps the Brothers underestimated the electorate. People would still vote for us,  they boasted, even if we nominated a dead dog. It wasn’t exactly flattering. Stubborn  Mubarak, was wise enough to grasp that he had to make concessions to gain popular  support at his time. In each of the three speeches Mubarak delivered during the revolt  of 2011, he gave significant ground. First he dismissed the cabinet, then the leader 

ship of the ruling party, he brought in an acceptable face to opposition to replace his  old guards to lead NDP, he dissolved the infamous Policy Committee and formed a  committee to purge the constitution of unpopular clauses; and then he pledged that  neither he nor his son would run in the presidential elections, which were only nine  months away.  

Morsi, in contrast, wouldn’t even reshuffle his cabinet or reinforce his legitimacy  with a popular referendum. Warned of looming rebellion, he described his opponents  as a handful of old regime scoundrels, and delivered an incredible two and a half hour  speech ridiculing his enemies by name and laughing repeatedly at his own jokes.  

I tweeted after his two speeches saying”” @HossamBadrawi: The president’s speech  is unbelievable ,he proposes either the Moslem brotherhood in power or blood  shed.”” 

“@HossamBadrawi: When 30 millions make their request clear, when judges,media,  artists, , professionals and police are supporting,who dares to call it a coup”

After being shown helicopter-recorded footage of the millions demonstrating against  him, he maintained that this ‘Photoshop revolution’ actually involved no more than a  few thousand people. In a second record-breaking speech (as it turned out, his last),  he shook his fist repeatedly, and insisted he was Egypt’s legitimate leader 98 times in  45 minutes. What his audience saw was not the arrogance of power but the vanity of  a fool. 

This was a historic uncoupling of Islam and Islamism in the Muslim popular psyche.  There were two reasons for it, one secular, and the other religious. As citizens, people  were appalled by the Brothers’ incompetence in government; and as Muslims, they  were outraged by the use of their religion to explain away this incompetence.  

The Brothers made people no longer saw them as god-fearing underdogs striving for  power so that they could implement Islam, but as another set of corrupt politicians  using Islam to justify themselves. They also detected a darker, more evil side to the  Morsi presidency. People also noted the frequent denunciation of the government’s  critics as enemies of Islam; the creation of armed groups to monitor public morality;  the declaration of a Jihad against Shiites; the release of thousands of militants by  presidential amnesty (to be available to terrorize opponents when needed); and the  subsequent declaration of an Islamist mini-emirate at the heart of Sinai. 

On the eve of the June uprising 2013 , Alekhwan set up camp outside the Rabaa al Adawiya mosque in Cairo and stayed there for forty nights. People would drop by to  have a look and to hear what was being said. What they witnessed stiffened their will  to rebel. They saw Al-Qaida banners at every corner; heard that the al-Qaida leader,  the Egyptian medic Ayman al-Zawahri, was making terrorist threats on the Brothers’  behalf; and listened to speeches rallying militants from around the globe, encouraging  them to blow themselves up in public squares. Opponents were collectively excom municated, and threatened with eternal damnation; David’s battle with Goliath was  invoked as were the Prophet’s victories over infidels and hypocrites. Any numbers of  grandiose claims were made: that the Archangel Gabriel prayed among the Brothers  and Prophet Mohamed prayed behind him!! 

This is why most Egyptians accepted the interim government’s designation of the  Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013. Everyone knows  that the actual perpetrators of violence are the Brothers’ unruly allies: al-Qaida-style  groups such as Ansar beit al-Maqdis and Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya. But by turning a po 

litical clash into a fully-fledged religious war between Islam and its enemies, the  Brothers created a context for terror. In the eyes of their compatriots, they were ulti-

mately responsible for every car bomb, suicide attack and assassination, as well as  the ceaseless attacks on churches ,and museums. 

As the Brothers committed political suicide, the security apparatus took advantage.  The country became locked in a vicious circle. Meanwhile Egyptians believed that  Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, had choices and he sided with people. He could have stood up  

for Morsi, who had never challenged military privileges openly, and desperately  courted the general’s political protection. And if he had, the Islamists would have  been in his debt for ever ( in theory) 

 In my opinion Sisi and his officers must have realized that supporting the Brothers  would entail massive repression, as the Brothers failures were bound to drive millions  onto the streets, with or without the encouragement of any one soon. The country  would be risking sliding into civil war. To repress the people on behalf of the Broth ers would be to identify with Islamist despotisms which will rule for decades. Inter vention on the side of ‘the people’ seemed the most efficient way to minimize the  threat to national security. Better to be accused of plotting a coup than be seen as im potent or in league with fascists, and added to this MBs are known for political dis honesty. 

Sisi had the support of the entire armed forces, not just a politicized junta, and was  soon able to prove it even though the Brothers moved quickly to win over the lower  ranks after Morsi was deposed and claimed to have many new recruits. Rumors circu lated about foreign governments making generous offers to any senior officer willing  to dislodge Sisi. In spite of that, Sisi decided to deploy officers and soldiers to protect  the demonstrations , he personally called for on 26 July. Evidently, he wasn’t worried  that some of his men might not come back: that they would join forces with the Is lamists or march back to the Defence Ministry to arrest him. In the event, not a single  soldier defected. At the end of January, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces  (Scaf) agreed to release Sisi so that he could run for the presidency. 

In 14 January 2014 referendum on a new constitution was approved by 98 per cent  of those who voted on a turnout of 38 per cent of registered voters; in 2012, MBs  constitution was approved by 64 per cent on a 33 per cent turnout. 

Yet to many politician Sisi has never disclosed his plan for the country’s future – as suming he has one. He projects himself as a new Nasser, but his idol had vast re sources thanks to the land he confiscated from the rich, the foreign companies he na tionalized, the absence of Parliament in early years of his rule and the Soviet Union  support. Nothing like this is available to Sisi. Since the late 1970s, Egypt’s economy  has come under the control of open market regulations and privet sector who employ  more than 14 million Egyptians , yet able to liquidate their investments and move  their funds offshore at the first sign of trouble. Correlation with Naser and the social ist sixties does not really help in 2014.

On the other hand the pockets of Egypt’s supporters in the Gulf are not as deep as  those of Communist Russia during the Cold War. Partnership with Egypt’s capitalists  in a US-style military-industrial complex might prove useful to the armed forces, but  it won’t bring social justice any closer. What will happen when those who currently  believe that Sisi’s presidency is the answer to their problems – to unemployment,  poverty, inadequate healthcare, under-funded education, poor public transportations ,  slums, and all the rest – come to realize that the country’s structural problems are be yond his capacity alone to solve? And how will Sisi react if his popularity begins to  crumble? Those are the questions that should be asked now.  

Moslem brotherhood wanted to change the identity of Egypt and they failed.  Thanks to the genetic make up of the Egyptian people who lived in peace with them selves, with no differentiation between copts and moslems or Sonnies and Shiite for  years. In one year, only one year Egyptians rejected the religious extremism and  stopped the fiction in the region. 

My family , and most of my friends, people i come across are supporting the man , as  the savior of Egypt from the darkness of political religious extremism and , yes he is ,  yet in my opinion , as experienced politicians and expert of development we should  help him define his way and give him alternatives to a shaky situation with patience  but also with time limit. However he should, on the other hand be ready to listen and  accommodate. 

 I believe Some hard decisions should have been taken by the transient current gov ernment related to difficult economic situation , even unpopular ones, to ease for  coming elected government to move faster and more efficient . Unfortunately this did  not happen.  

In all cases , under any circumstances the zone of freedom and tolerance should not  be allowed to shrink, and this should be a conscious decision not to be left to dynam ics of events , but to leadership direction.  

This last statement comes as a response to the feelings i expressed at the beginning  of this article when i was invited to a TV talk show about the current political situa tion 

Hossam Badrawi 

The story of Egypt 

February 2014