Some Memories of January By Hossam Badrawi

Some Memories of January
By Hossam Badrawi

Every time the months of January and February come around, the story of Egypt as I saw it in 2011 keeps revolving in my mind, based on the information available to me, which I summarized and documented in my unpublished memoirs. I know from experience that events, when written at the time of their occurrence, differ from what is written afterward. Some events have varying impressions and mixed perceptions influenced by knowledge that unfolds over time, and impressions may differ or multiply after the event.

Therefore, I made it a personal commitment to write and record my thoughts, and document my impressions day by day and moment by moment. Even if I change my mind due to the revelation of new facts, revisiting the reading of the moment’s emotions and analyzing its reality at the time is important in recording history.

I believe that the 2011 revolution left the security apparatus partially intact from my point of view in Egypt. Later on, we discovered that one of the main goals of those behind the scenes of the revolution – the Muslim Brotherhood – was to destroy the head of the security institution in the Ministry of Interior and create intense tension between any official uniform and the people. Nevertheless, the armed forces maintained their independence and appeared sound and confident, though they tended to assist any civilian structure other than the National Party, which governed policies and elections. However, they did not actually govern the country, and we have something to say about this when the time comes.

The dismantling of the State Security apparatus was a goal, as it was the mind of the Ministry of Interior, confirmed through the dismissal of its leaders, the theft of its documents, and changing its name, leaving it vulnerable to the anger of the rebellious youth, which pleased the revolutionaries. The State Security apparatus became a victim of the revolution, which inevitably has its victims, like the National Party.

Unfortunately, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists were the only alternative to the National Party. They had organization and funding. It is certain that the people did not protest in Tahrir Square to hand over power to a fanatical religious rule, but in my opinion, the armed forces were seeking to remove the structure of the National Party from the power game as quickly as possible because the constitutional reality at that time was clear: the next president of Egypt would be a civilian from the existing political parties, which positioned one of the civilians leading the National Party as a major presidential candidate.

The idea of inheritance was dominant in people’s minds, despite President Mubarak’s repeated confirmation that it was not real. I imagine that the inheritance of power, for a civilian (and the army leaders believed he was the son of the president), would protect him with quasi-military authority represented by the police force. This was a valid reason for army leaders who opposed the idea of inheritance to focus their anger on the National Party, as they considered it the nurturing environment for the embryo of inheritance and the possibilities of a weak civilian rule.

Once again, I have a lot to say about this matter, as I witnessed and participated in the events. I had previously declared my cultural and political opposition to inheritance, but with democracy, which caused me a lot of damage in my political career, intentionally sabotaged in the elections by some party leaders.

The question of who would assume the political position was raised at some point after January, and there were limited negotiations. It seemed to me that some army leaders did not object to the Muslim Brotherhood’s thirst for power. They were more organized than the activists who ignited the revolution, and they were the only alternative to the remnants of the National Party, who were the target of organized political attacks and reputation tarnishing by the revolutionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood did not receive full acceptance from many leaders of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

The creation of a political vacuum was the trap into which Egypt fell, blinded by the massive propaganda that was created to exclude all organized political forces except the Muslim Brotherhood.

At that time, the Muslim Brotherhood did not pose any apparent threat to the privileges of the armed forces, and in fact, I believe they had no intention of dismantling the infrastructure of the dictatorial regime in Egypt and subjecting themselves to the volatile atmosphere of the democratic process. They only wanted to seize Mubarak’s position at the top and use the momentum of the revolution in formal democratic procedures to reach power, threatening behind the scenes to ignite the fire on the Egyptian streets in case of their failure, and they succeeded in doing so.

The first enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood was the State Security apparatus, and to a lesser extent, the Egyptian intelligence, who knew everything about them. They knew their sources of wealth and the internal and external relationships they had with international intelligence agencies, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in getting rid of the State Security apparatus, as I mentioned, without resistance from some army leaders who believed that the apparatus supported inheritance on one hand. In another context, their situation was exposed to the anger of the authorities in general, which allowed the armed forces to avoid confrontation with the revolutionaries. Later on, the Muslim Brotherhood included an article in the Islamic constitution that prevents any qualified civilian leaders from the National Party from competing for the presidency for a period of ten years, thus eliminating the organization capable of competing with them and the individuals qualified to compete with them.

In February 2011, before Mubarak’s downfall and his relinquishment of power, I note that while the protesters were fortified in Tahrir Square, Mohammed Morsi, representing the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saad al-Katatni engaged in open and secret negotiations with the head of the intelligence agency and the vice president, Omar Suleiman, to obtain a larger share of power in exchange for stopping the revolution. I personally attended one of these meetings on February 5th, where Mohammed Morsi represented the Muslim Brotherhood after escaping from prison with the help of armed attacks, which at that time were suspected to be fighters from Hamas who crossed the borders from Gaza for this reason, and it was later confirmed.

As a politician at that time, I raised my objection to Omar Suleiman, the Vice President, questioning the presence of an escaped prisoner in a meeting of political forces. However, he urged me to let the matter pass and advised me to trust him and not create more tension and confusion in the negotiations, as there was much more happening beneath the surface.
After that, I was excluded from any future negotiations and completely marginalized out of fear that I would not be a team player. Some of President Mubarak’s assistants considered my presence to be merely formal because they saw it as a threat to them.
After Mubarak’s ousting, the Muslim Brotherhood pressured and adopted the proposed security-military program, which included parliamentary elections first, followed by the constitution and later reforms. However, the few, including myself, who argued that the new democracies needed some basic guidelines before rushing into the ballot boxes, were excluded, attacked, and marginalized. I remember that Mr. Munir Abdel Nour, Ms. Mani Dhu Al-Faqar, and I tried to dissuade the leaders of the moment from rushing into that, but we did not succeed.
During this transitional period, after the Muslim Brotherhood won slightly over 40% of the parliamentary seats, as expected, against a divided and unorganized political bloc, the Muslim Brotherhood showed their true face and blamed the protesters for the violence directed towards them by the state. They repeatedly claimed that activists were pawns of foreign intelligence agencies. In parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood seized every available opportunity to praise law enforcement agencies and prevented all attempts to hold them accountable after they took control.
The contradictions in their positions became evident when the Muslim Brotherhood transitioned from being opposition to being in power.
As soon as Morsi took the oath of office, after threatening civil war if the results were not announced in their favor, he congratulated the police (the enemies of the recent past) for reforming themselves, boldly referring to them as revered partners in the 2011 revolution. Needless to say, security violations increased during Morsi’s short tenure, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s militias solidified their official coercion. Their goal was to consolidate all forces in favor of maintaining their grip on power.
I must mention that the “democratically elected” president from the Muslim Brotherhood and his regime violated all laws and norms of legitimacy. His supporters besieged the Supreme Constitutional Court for over 30 days to obstruct justice and delay rulings in two crucial cases concerning the constitutionality of both the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council.
During that period, the president granted himself the right to legislate and immunized all his decisions from judicial scrutiny. He violated his constitutional oath by dismissing the prosecutor general and appointing a person of his own choice, exceeding his constitutional limits. Thus, he became the supreme ruler of Egypt, the executive, legislator, and judge.
Let us remember history and facts so that we do not get lost in new wishes based on forgetfulness and loss of memory.
This is a time for stability, working together, and building, not demolishing.
Life is about choices, and it is not right at every crossroad to choose the same path and expect different results.